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The Provision of Public Goods
under
the Proportional Taxation System
TADAHIRO UEMATSU*
I Introductiron
The provision of public goods can be peformed either under the bene-
( I)
fit principle or the ability-to-pay principle. Under the former, the tax-price
of one public good differs from person to another, and is proportionate to
the person's marginal substitution of that good to private goods. This is
one of the necessary conditions for the "Lindahl Equilibrium" which is on
Pareto optimum(Foley( 4 )). Moreover, if we can apply an overall cal-
culation for maximizing the social welfare function, we can also calculate
the optimal production and income redistribution in addition to optimal
prices, from the viewpoint of maximization of social welfare (Samuelson
(8 )).
It seems to us, however, that public goods are not actually provided
under the benefit principle except in a few cases, in contrast to the great
pile ,of theoretical accumulation. The first reason for this may be due
to the so-called "free rider problem" or false assertion of preferences' for
public goods. Since people will not be excluded from the consumption of
* The author is assistant professor in the school of law and literature of
Okayama University. The research is financially supported by the Grant
Aid for Scientific Research of the Ministry of Education.
( 1) There are many difinitions on public goods. We simply define them as
those which are equally enjoyed consuming by all the people in the commu-
nity.
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public good even if they assert less than their actual preferences, the demand
for public goods will be less than optimal as a whole. In other words,
this is the problem of information costs about preferences. In order to get a
picture of the true preferences, government will have to gather a great
deal of information, which costs might prevent the provision plan of
this public good in some cases.
Secondly, we must not disregard the regressve taxation effect of this
principle. For example, people with low income can not supply private
alternatives for public goods like public education, public housing or
parks, so their marginal substitution of these goods and, therefore, their
tax-prices will be fairly high. This difficulty will not be overcome without
proper income redistribution, which is not always easily performed.
On the other hand, much more severe assumptions of comparability
of interpersonal utility and the constant size of public expenditure often
(2 )
have been presupposed in the ability-to-pay principle theories. But these
assumptions do not seem indispensable. Bowen( 1) presented an excellent
model to decide the size of public expenditure by citizens'· voting though in
a partial equilibrium model. Foley( 3), from the quite different point of
view, showed the existence of a public competitive equilibrium with pro-
portional taxation. These two have a characteristic to have shown how
to decide the size of public expenditure on the ability-to-pay principle.
In this paper I will also analyse the provision of public goods under
proportional taxation in a competitive equilibrium. With a simple model,
we compare Foley's model with Bowen's one, and find the relation
of these two models which seem quite different at a glance. Section II
(2) See Musgrave (6) chapter 5 for an excellent discussion about abilify-to-pay
principle.
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presents a basic model from which Foley's public competitive equilibrium
and Bowen's voting procedure derive. Section ][ analyses the difference
between these two models from our standpoint. And section IV gives a
device for voting in the case with many private goods. Finally, section
V presents a comparison between these two models in regard to distribu-
tional effect and information costs.
IT Model
For simplicity, we assume there are two private goods x j(j = 1,2) ,
one public good X g , three citizens (i=1,2,3), one large production insti-
tution or firm, and one government. It is also assumed that the first
private good Xl is used for production of the second private good X2 and
public good X g by this firm. Then consumption vector Xi and initial
endowment vector Xi of each citizen are written as
(i=l, 2, 3.)
Production vector Y= (YI,Yz,Ya) is restricted in the production set Y by
the production function F(y»O.
yEY = {y I F(y)::?:O}
Supply price vector of private goods and public good is
p= (PI, Pz, pg).
We also make the following assumptions.
1. Utility funcions of all people Ui(X i ) are continuous, increasing
and concave functions of X'i.
2. Production function F (y) is also a continuous, increasing and
concave function of y. Production is also assumed to satisfy the con-
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straints of the possibility of inaction, the impossibility of land of Cockai-
gne and the irreversibility of production.
OEY, YnR+={O}, Yn(-Y)'={O}.
3. The profit of the firm 77: is completely distributed among three
citizens, with distributive share /hi fixed.
77:= ~/hiTC. (0 < /hi < 1)
4. Government makes a final decision about allocation, keeping ba-
lanced budget on a proportional income taxation. Expressing the tax rate
and the i-th citizen's income as t and Mi, we have
pgX g = t ~l\.1i.
Based on these 'assumptions, competitive equilibrium with public good
is formulated as follows.
Dejiniiion Competive Eguilibrium
Competitive equilibrium is a triple vector (x, Y, p) which satisfies
following conditions.
A) Demand does not exceeds supply
~X;::;;:: Yj+ ~x}
, ,
(j= 1, 2)
Xo ::;;:: Yo'
B) Citizen maximizes Ui(X i ) subject to
PgXo=t~Mi.
C) Firm maximizes profit 77:=~PjYj+PoYo subject to F(y)~O.
D) Government 'maximizes social welfare W = W (ul, u2, u3) subject
to
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Can this competitive equilibrium be proved to exist? Unfortunately,
its existence does not seem to be directly assured. Figure 1 discribes the
projection into (Xli xu) plane with·the other private good fixed. From
the assumptions 1 and 2, total consumption set and production set are
confined to convex, compact sets ABO and OeD respectively. Given
price vector (Ph P2, pg), the firm makes an optimal production at point
F where hiper-plane of price vector is tangent to production set.
Production at F brings about profit 77:.
'Figure 1
y
.J'L
- P,
D • d
y,
Price vector P also specifies tax rate t and everyone's income Mi
from the equations Mi=L:PIXhl-"i7t, Pax~=tL:Mi, x~=Xg, and xus;;.Ya'
Consumers want to maximize their utilities under these prices, tax and
income constraints so that they select respectively different consumption
El, E 2 , and E 3• As easily seen in Figure 1, demand and supply of both
private good and public good will generally be different. So price vector
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has to shift. But in which direction? From the property of public good,
x~ should be"'equal to Xg. But in Figure 1, x~>Xg>xJ>xb Then it
is not clear whether or not public good should be extensively produced
without any exogeneous adjustment means. This means a failure tOe
(3)
accomplish a "competitive equilibrium" under the ability-to-pay theory.
Two abjustment procedures can be imagined; one is the governmenta,
selection of the size of public expenditure from the viewpoint of the
maximization of social welfare, and the other is the selection by voting
among people. The former was studied by Foley (3), and the latter by
Bowen (1). So we would like to compare them in next section.
][ Two Adjustment Procedures
In the definition of Foley's public competitiive equilibrium, condition
B) and D) of our definition are changed so that citizens select optimal
consumption of private goods given the supply of public good while
government selects optimal consumption of public good given information
(4)
about' citizens' preferences. According to Foley (3) and Homma (5),
this interaction between citizens and government will lead to an equili-
brium if the social marginal significance of each citizen is equal to the
reciprocal of the marginal utility of his income in equilibrium. This pro-
position, bases on the following proposition about Pareto optimum.
( 3) Under the benefit principle, competitive equilibrium can be attained by the
private transactions, if free rider problem is avoided. But under the ability-
to-pay principle, it can not generally attained by the private transactions,
as we analysed here.
( 4) This statement is slightly different from that of Foley's original def-
inition. But it does not distort his intention. Our definition is due to Ro-
mma C5) , which succeeded in extent;on of Foley's original model. We deep-
ly owe to him this paragraph.
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Definition Pareto Optimum
Pareto optimum is defined as the vector (Xl, X 2, X 3, y) which maxi-
mizes the social welfare function W=L;kiui (Xi), (k i ~ 0, L;ki=l)
under the constraints
L;x; ~ YJ+ L;xJ
, ,
x g :::;: Yo
F(y) ~ o.
(i= 1, 2)
and
Proposition 1. Under the assumptions 1 and 2, there exists one Pareto
optimum for any {kiJ.
Proof. Under the assumptions 1 and 2, consumption vector (x,!' x 2,
x 3) and production vector yare confined to compact, convex sets respe-
ctively. Social welfare function W is a continuous function of Xi from
the construction of W. Then, by Weierstrass' theorem, there is a vector
(x!' x 2, x 3, y) which maximizes W = L;ki Ui(Xi ) for any {ki }.
Q; E. D.
In the one private good-one public good case, Proposition 1 assures
the existence of public competitve equilibrium, because in this case citizens
have no room to make their own selection after the government decides
the size of supply of public good, and therefore Pareto optimum is a
necessary and sufficient condition for public competitive equilibrium.
Even if there are more than one private good and one public good,
the existence can be proven if the marginal social significance of each
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citizen is to be equal to the reciprocal of the marginal utility of his income
( 5 )
in equilibrium. This might be a little bit severe condition.
On the other hand, Bowen C1) tries to decide the size of public
expenditure by citizens' voting, viewing that competitive equilibrium can
not be attained directly. Though he analysed it in a partial equilibrium
model with fixed income and equal division of cost, we can easily refor-
mulate it in a competitive equilibrium model with a proportinal income
tax.
Let us suppose a situation where the congress composed of all the
citizens in the community tries to decide the optimal provision· of public
good. Given information about the firm, the citizen tries to maximize his
utility by the selection of the most favourable production and taxation.
So he tries to maximize Ui(X i) subject to
1. budget constraint
z:,PjX; ::;;: (1- t)Mi
PgX~=tz:,Mi
2. feasibility condition
rr=max C'j~PjYj+PgYg) subject to F(y) ~ 0, and
3. public good condition
xb ::;;: X g ::;;: yg •
Is it possible for the citizen to find an "optimal" plan of consump-
tion? In order to reply to this question, we have to separate one pri-
vate good case from more than one private good case.
( 5) See Hoinma C5) pp54-56.
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If there is only one private good besides public good, the supply
of public good and proportional taxation substantially confine the citizen's
budget constraint set to a subset of total consumption set which is
compact. Moreover, from the above conditions 1 and 2, his budget con-
straint is closed, then it is also compact. By assumption 1, utility function
Ui(Xi ) is continuous on this set, so a maximal value can be found on
a point in this set. This assures "optimal" plan for the i-th citizen.
Let us confirm this assertion by a simple example.
Example 1. Suppose that private good Xl is the input for production
of public good xo, and that production function is Yl=-by~ (O<b<{oo).
Let us also suppose the i-th citizen's initial endowment is (xi, 0).
In order to attain optimal production, the firm has to
maximize 7r= PIX1+PgXg
subject to Yl = - bY~
which brings about an optimal production
and maximal profit 7r = P~/ 4bPJ.
Total consumption set C is
C= {(Xl, Xg) I xl+bx~ ~ :Exi}
and the i-th citizen's budget constraint set Ci is expressed as follows
Ci= {(xi, x~) I xl (:Exi+ bX~2) ~ (xi+bJ1'iX~2) (:Exi-bx~2)}
(o~xi~xi, o::;;:x~::;;: {:Exfjb}t)
So it is clear that Cl is compact.
Figure 2 shows this example. With supply price (Ph Po), supply of
goods which is consistent with maximal profit of firm is point D, and
under proportional taxation, the citizen's budget line is GK. But only
Di on this line is feasible for him from the property of public good.
Then given price (Ph Po), he selects Di. If the price vector changes to
- 96-
The provision of public goods under the proportional taxation system 177
Xl
(Pl!:i<~+;rt)/;; H
(PIX"+l1iJrV-;; G
·xir--_::"----
o "
Figare 2
(P/, Pa'), he will selects another point DiI, a"nd these points on budget
constraints lines make a budget constraint set Ci. It is easy to see that
the utility function has a tangency point with this set C!. It is an "opti-
mal" plan for him.
Generally speaking, "optimal" public expenditure for the i-th citizen
will be different from that for the j-th citizen (j~i), however. Then let
us adopt a majority voting rille for adjustment. When government offers
one plan for the provision of public good, if majority of the people pre-
fers an extension as opposed to reduction, government extends the
demand of public good and vice versa. The provision of public good is in
an equilibrium if the number of citizens who assert extension is equal to
that of citizens who assert reduction. Then, clearly, the existence of an
equilibrinm i.s assured if there is an odd number of people.
Turning back Example 1, look at Figure 3. It shows that voting
decides all.
Each citizen asserts his most favourable demand of public good E 1,
E 2, or E 3 in which his utility function is tangent to his budget con-
- 97-
118
Xl
Ii
-1Xl"~
c3
Figure 3
L...-_~-_-:'-_-----''--------=K~-·Xg
Xg
straint set. But voting results in the adoption of the second citizen/s
proposal x3 (in Figure 3). At the same time, voting decides all other
necessary items, the consumption of private good (E/, E:, E'3), the
supply of both goods E, the supply price shown by the slope of HK,
and the tax rate. It is to be noted that the supply and demand of private
good meet in this case.
Then as far as one private good -one public good case is concerned,
voting is almighty in that it can decide all the necessary items in the e-
conomy. This is a straight extension of Bowen's voting procedure to a
competitive equilibrium analysis with proportional taxation.
We summarize this conclusion as a proposition.
Proposition 2. If there is one private good besides one public good,
(6)
the voting' procedure brings about an equilibrium.
( 6 ) This proposition is easily extended to many public goods case so far as
there is only one private good, because then budget constraint sets Ci of
all citizens are also confined to compact subset of C respectively.
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IV Trouble in the Voting Procedure
In this section, it will be revealed that whenever there is more than
one private good, voting has to follow a double procedure and then it
will have a similar characteristic to the public competitive equilibrium.
Let us take up a simple example to see this, at first.
Example 2. Suppose that the first private good is used for the produ-
ction of the second private good and public good, and that the production
function is Yl= - (ay~+by~), (O<a, b4;oo). Let us also suppose the i-
th citizen's initial endowment is (xl, 0, 0).
In order to attain an optimal production, the firm has to
maximize 7T: = ~PjYj+PuYg
subject to Yl=-(ay~+by~),
which brings about an optimal production (Yl, Y2, Yo)
P bP~+ P52~;1' 2bPr) and maximal profit7T: = 4abPl
Total consumption set C is
C= {(Xl, X2, xo) I xl+ax~+bx;:::::;:~xl}
But the i -th citizen's budget constraint set C! is not necessarily a subset
of C, because Ci depends on the price vector.
TherefOle, whenever there is more than one private good, citizen may
select a point outside of total consumption set C in some price vector and
then voting can not determine of demand and supply of private goods.
This is the essential trouble with the voting procedure.
As a device, let us consider the following double procedure. First of
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H :Figure 4
/K
Xg
all, people ascertain the total consumption set and their initial endow-
ments value, according to variously supposed price vector (Pl> pz, pg)-
Then they try to decide optmal demand for public good by voting,
with disregard to the second private good for the moment. This
voting procedure is the same as that in Example 1, and it will decide
public expenditure OC (in Figure 4), for instance. Proportional taxation
assures financial resources, and it 'will leave remaining incomes xl, xi
and xi respectively. Next, when public good as much as OC is produced,
the consumption possibility set of private goods is EF C. Then people try
to trade private goods as if they are in a private economy. The trade
will lead to a competitive equilibrium, which shows optimal total demand
and individual demand for private goods. Finally, the total demand for
public good and private good points out optimal production and supply
price vector.
To sum up. Whenever there is more than one private good in an eco-
nomy, voting about optimal demand for public good has to be supple-
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mented by the free trade of private goods. Together voting and trade
decide optimal selection. We formulate this as a proposition.
Proposition 3. Whenever there is more than one private good in
an economy, voting about public good and free trade of private goods
attain together an equilibrium.
V Comparison
In the preceding two sections, we analysed that the provision of public
goods can be performed either in a public competitive equilibrium or by
voting procedure. In this section we would like to compare them from
the viewpoint of distributional effect and information costs.
In regard to distributional effect, public competitive equilibrium intends
to respect the initial condition as competitive equilibrium without public
goods does so. Since marginal significance k i is to be equal to the reciprocal
of the marginal utility of income, it will be larger forthe citizen with higher
income than for the one with lower income, if utility functions do not
differ one another to a great extent and if they are concave functions.
Then in an equilibrium, the citizen with higher initial endowment (i. e.
higher income) gets a higher social weight ki • Social welfare function
based on this weight vector {k i ) will correspond to an equilibrium re-
specting initial endowments.
On the other hand, distributive effect of voting procedure is not
necessarily clear. In this case optimal selection of the i-th citizen
depends on the initial endowment xi, distributive share !hi and the confi-
guration of his utility function Ui(Xi).
First of all, if the distributive shares are nearly equal one another,
and utility functions are similar among all the citizens, the citizen with
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initially medium income is advantageous, as Bowen showed in his origi-
nal paper (Bowen C1 ) section lIT). Secondly if preferences of the people
are different even though distributive sahres are equal, the citizen with
medium preference for public good in an equilibrium will be advanta-
geous. But he may belong either to the highre income class' or to the
lower one. Finally if JLi is reversely related to xi, the economic hierar-
chy will change as production extends so that we can not prospect in
advance which citizen will be most advantageous in an "optimal" provision
of public good.
In the second place, in regard to the mformation coat, voting
procedure is much better than public competitive equilibrium. Voting only
needs n proposals and the reaction of the citizens to each proposal (n is
the number of the citizens).
On the other hand public competitive equilibrium needs a great deal
of information on preferences in order to make a social welfare function
as we showed in sectIOn lIT.
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